Honey, I Shrunk Your Damages!

Yebuah et al. v. Center for Urological Treatment, PLC Holds that Tennessee’s Cap on Non-Economic Damages Applies Collectively to Spouses’ Claims

By: Meridian Law

Introduction                       

In 2011, the Tennessee legislature passed a law limiting the non-economic damages that a plaintiff can recover for a personal injury claim to $750,000.[1]  Non-economic damages include “damages for pain and suffering, as well as any claims of a spouse or children for the loss of consortium.”[2]  Last year, the constitutionality of this statute was challenged in court on the grounds that it took away a plaintiff’s right to a trial by jury. However, the Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the law, finding that “the General Assembly was within its legislative authority to alter the common law by enacting the statutory cap on non-economic damages.”[3]

Just last month, in Yebuah, et al. v. Center for Urological Treatment, PLC, the Tennessee Supreme Court addressed another issue related to the damages cap: When an injured plaintiff’s spouse files a claim for loss of consortium, does the non-economic damages cap apply to both spouses’ claims separately or collectively?[4]  The Court held that the damages cap applied to both spouses collectively, meaning that a non-economic damages award for both spouses’ claims could not exceed $750,000.[5]

Background Facts

Yebuah was a medical malpractice case.  The plaintiff in Yebuah discovered that a medical device was left in her abdomen for eight years following surgery.[6]  She brought a health care liability action against the medical providers responsible for leaving the device.[7]  In addition to the plaintiff’s personal injury claims, the plaintiff’s husband brought a claim for loss of consortium.[8]

After the case went to trial, a jury awarded the plaintiff non-economic damages far exceeding the $750,000 statutory cap: $2,000,000 for pain and suffering and $2,000,000 for loss of enjoyment of life.[9]  Additionally, the jury awarded her husband $500,000 for loss of consortium.[10]  

The defendant argued that under the damages cap statute, the total award for both spouses’ combined non-economic damages should be limited to $750,000.[11]  The plaintiff, however, asserted that the damages cap applied to each claim individually.[12]  The trial court agreed with the plaintiff, reducing the plaintiff’s non-economic damages award to $750,000 and awarding her husband $500,000. [13]

The defendant appealed.  The Tennessee Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court’s interpretation and application of the statute and upheld the non-economic damages award.[14]

The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the statute’s plain language required the damages cap to be applied collectively to the spouses’ claims.

Tennessee Supreme Court’s Analysis

The plaintiff put forward four arguments in support of her position that the damages applied to her and her husband separately:

(1)   The inclusion of the phrase “each injured plaintiff” illustrated the legislature’s intent to impose a per plaintiff cap;[15]

(2)  To treat the spouse as “uninjured” failed to recognize that the spouse suffered a legal injury and essentially got rid of the common law claim for consortium;[16]

(3)  Another damage capping statute had been interpreted to apply to plaintiffs individually rather than collectively;[17] and

(4)  Applying the damages cap to apply collectively would hurt marriages by requiring spouses to split the jury’s award.[18]

The Tennessee Supreme Court noted that its job in interpreting the statute was to “effectuate legislative intent.”[19]  In doing so, the Court needed to rely on the meaning of the statute’s plain and ordinary language.[20]  The Court concluded that the legislature’s decision to use the phrase “injured plaintiff” did not show intent for a per-plaintiff damages cap.[21]  Otherwise, the Court reasoned, including the word “injured” would be superfluous.[22]

The Court was also unmoved by the plaintiffs’ argument that applying the damages cap collectively would eliminate the common law claim for loss of consortium.[23] The Court explained that “[i]n a situation in which the damages are capped, the consortium spouse does not ‘lose’ his or her claim . . . . Their damages are simply limited.”[24] The Court explained that even if the statute abolished the claim for loss of consortium, the legislature had that power.[25]

The plaintiffs also asserted that the Court should apply the damages cap per plaintiff because that was how the damages caps under another statute, the Governmental Tort Liability Act, were applied.[26] The Court reasoned that the interpretation of the GTLA was inapplicable, noting that “[t]he cap for bodily injury or death under the GTLA is for each person—not ‘each injured plaintiff.’”[27]

Finally, the Court found the plaintiffs’ policy argument unpersuasive, explaining, “[I]t does not matter whether this Court believes the statute to be wise or artfully written—our duty is simply to interpret the statute.”[28]

Ultimately, the Court held that “Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-39-102 creates a single cap on noneconomic damages that includes those awarded to the primary injured spouse as well as those awarded to the other spouse for a derivative loss of consortium claim.”[29]  The derivative nature of loss of consortium claims limits the scope of this holding.  Presumably, in a case where two spouses have injuries and bring loss of consortium claims in addition to claims for their own injuries, the cap would apply separately to each spouse because each spouse would be considered an “injured plaintiff” under the statute.

Takeaways

Yebuah provides Tennessee attorneys, as well as potential plaintiffs and defendants, with a few significant takeaways. For starters, the Court’s careful interpretation of the statute can act as a guide for attorneys.  It is crucial to analyze a statute’s plain language to ascertain its meaning. Turning to evidence outside of the statute’s plain language may not always be persuasive to a court. 

Yebuah expressly reaffirmed the Tennessee Supreme Court’s holding that Tennessee’s cap on non-economic damages is constitutional. Defendants should be aware of this cap when evaluating cases and attempting to resolve them. The defendant saved $500,000 in this case by establishing that the cap applied to the consortium claim.  

Disclaimer: The information in this blog post (“post”) is provided for general informational purposes only and may not reflect the current law in your jurisdiction.  No information contained in this post should be construed as legal advice from Meridian Law, PLLC, or the individual author, nor is it intended to be a substitute for legal counsel on any subject matter. No reader of this post should act or refrain from acting based on any information included in or accessible through this post without seeking the appropriate legal or other professional advice on the particular facts and circumstances at issue from a lawyer licensed in the recipient’s state, country, or other appropriate licensing jurisdiction.

[1]           Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-39-102(a)(2) (West). The statute provides that

(a) In a civil action, each injured plaintiff may be awarded:

(1) Compensation for economic damages suffered by each injured plaintiff; and

(2) Compensation for any non-economic damages suffered by each injured plaintiff not to exceed seven hundred fifty thousand dollars ($750,000) for all injuries and occurrences that were or could have been asserted, regardless of whether the action is based on a single act or omission or a series of acts or omissions that allegedly caused the injuries or death. Id.

[2]                 Id. § 29-39-102(e).

[3]                 McClay v. Airport Mgmt. Servs., LLC, 596 S.W.3d 686, 691 (Tenn. 2020).

[4]                 Yebuah v. Ctr. for Urological Treatment, PLC, No. M201801652SCR11CV, 2021 WL 2217483, at *1 (Tenn. June 2, 2021).

[5]                 Id.at *2

[6]                 Id.

[7]                 Id.

[8]                 Id.

[9]                 Id.

[10]                Id.

[11]                Id.

[12]                Id.

[13]                Id.

[14]                Id. at *3.

[15]                Id. at 4.

[16]                Id. at *5.

[17]                Id. at *6.

[18]                Id.

[19]                Id. at 4.

[20]               Id.

[21]               Id.

[22]               Id.

[23]               Id. at *5.

[24]               Id.

[25]               Id. (“[T]he General Assembly was within its legislative authority to . . . enact[ ] the statutory cap on non-economic damages.”).

[26]               Id. at 6.

[27]               Id.

[28]               Id.

[29]               Id. at *7.