Pelcha v. MW Bancorp, Inc. - Sixth Circuit Declines to Extend Lighter Burden of Proof in Sex Discrimination Cases to Age-Based Firings
By: Meridian Law
In Pelcha v. MW Bancorp, Inc.,[1] the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently affirmed a decision from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, which dismissed a 47-year-old plaintiff’s Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) case on summary judgment.[2] As a result, the Sixth Circuit confirmed that plaintiffs seeking recovery for impermissible age-based firings must prove their age was the sole cause, and not one of several reasons, for their dismissal. This decision is important for Tennessee residents because the decisions of the Sixth Circuit are binding on Tennessee federal courts. Also, it is important for Tennessee employees and employers because it exhibits that plaintiffs suing for age discrimination have a heavy burden of proof if they are to survive summary judgment.
Facts Underlying Pelcha’s Lawsuit[3]
Melanie Pelcha worked for Watch Hill Bank for eleven years, starting in 2005. Originally, Pelcha reported to the Senior Vice President of Deposit Operations. However, in May of 2016, Pelcha’s supervisor changed. Pelcha and her new supervisor did not get along. The primary source of friction was the new time-off request policy. Pelcha’s new supervisor implemented a policy that employees request time-off requests, in writing, a month in advance.
In July of 2016, Pelcha needed time off to take her son to a dentist appointment. Pelcha claims she obtained verbal permission from her supervisor to take leave. However, she did not submit a leave request a month before, despite knowing about the policy. Pelcha eventually submitted a written leave request the day before the appointment.
After that, the conflict between Pelcha and her supervisor escalated. Her supervisor met with the bank’s President and CEO, who had a zero-tolerance policy for insubordination, and explained Pelcha’s failure to turn in the form and other workplace issues. The CEO intervened and investigated. He fired Pelcha on July 12, 2016, for insubordination. The bank offered a severance package, which Pelcha rejected and demanded settlement of her age discrimination claim. Pelcha sued the bank when it declined.
The Trial Court’s Dismissal of Pelcha’s Case[4]
Pelcha claimed that the following evidence supported her claim of age discrimination:
(1) The CEO’s comments about another 80-year-old employee “reaching her shelf life”;
(2) The CEO’s preference for younger workers and advice to reduce the 80-year-old’s hours to the point that she would be forced to quit; and
(3) Her supervisor’s different treatment of younger employees evidenced by not enforcing the time-off policy consistently for each employee.
The bank moved for summary judgment, arguing that Pelcha could not establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. Alternatively, the bank also argued that even if Pelcha could establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, there was a non-discriminatory reason for her termination. The trial court found that Pelcha established her prima facie case based on the above evidence. Still, the bank was nonetheless entitled to a dismissal of Pelcha’s case as a matter of law because she could not prove that her age was the sole cause of her termination. Thus, the trial court explained that an employee alleging unlawful treatment under the ADEA must offer evidence “that the employer’s action would not have occurred but for the employee’s age.[5] That means the employee must do more than show that age was a “motivating factor” in her firing.[6] The employee must prove by a preponderance of the evidence (either direct or circumstantial) that age was the “but for” cause for being fired. Since Pelcha could not prove that her age was the “but for” cause for her termination, the trial court dismissed her case.
To succeed, Pelcha would have required evidence, without inference, that age discrimination was the “but for” cause of her termination. The evidence typically needed to establish this but-for causation is either written or verbal statements such as:
(1) Statements by the decision-maker while acting in the scope of employment.
(2) Which relate to the decision making, i.e., termination, process.
(3) More than “vague, ambiguous, or isolated” statements.
(4) Proximity to the time of the termination.[7]
In Pelcha’s case, though she established the first criteria, she could not establish the other three. A plaintiff must establish all four criteria to survive summary judgment.
The Sixth Circuit Confirms “But For” (Single Cause) Standard in ADEA Cases[8]
Pelcha appealed the trial court’s decision granting the bank’s motion for summary judgment. Part of her argument was that the standard for showing that she would not have been fired “but for” her age was altered by a recent United States Supreme Court decision – Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). Bostock was a sex-based discrimination case. The Court in Bostock interpreted Title VII’s “because of” language and concluded that it included terminations with multiple motivations, not just sex-related motivations. In other words, under Title VII, a plaintiff does not have to prove their gender was the only reason they were fired. However, Pelcha sued under the ADEA, not Title VII. The standard under the ADEA is higher than under Title VII.
The Sixth Circuit rejected Pelcha’s attempt to extend the lighter burden of proof to ADEA cases for two reasons. First, the Sixth Circuit noted that the rule in Bostock was narrowly applied to Title VII and refused to stretch the definition to apply to the ADEA. Second, the Court explained the controlling case is Gross v FBL FIN. Servs. Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, not Bostock. Under Gross, a termination is either motivated by age or not. Gross established the standard that plaintiffs must prove that age was the “but-for” cause of the termination. Age cannot simply be one of various factors. It unequivocally stated that ADEA plaintiffs must show that age was “the reason” they were fired, not one of multiple reasons.[9]
Pelcha could not follow Bostock’s reasoning because Pelcha did not have a claim under Title VII. Bostock presented a narrow line of reasoning only applicable to Title VII cases.
Takeaways and Conclusion
Pelcha makes it abundantly clear to lawyers and litigants alike that they face an uphill battle when suing under the ADEA. If you allege that your employer fired you because of your age, you will have to show that your age was the sole cause you were dismissed. If employers can provide unrefuted evidence that factors other than age were the “but for” cause of the employee’s termination, then they should be able to prevail on summary judgment.
If you have any questions about the issues described in this article, would like assistance drafting or reviewing your employment agreement, or need assistance defending an ADEA claim, please get in touch with Meridian Law, PLLC at (615) 229-7499, info@meridian.law, or www.meridian.law. We are here to help you navigate your employment law issues.
Disclaimer: The information in this blog post (“post”) is provided for general informational purposes only and may not reflect the current law in your jurisdiction. No information contained in this post should be construed as legal advice from Meridian Law, PLLC, or the individual author, nor is it intended to be a substitute for legal counsel on any subject matter. No reader of this post should act or refrain from acting based on any information included in or accessible through this post without seeking the appropriate legal or other professional advice on the particular facts and circumstances at issue from a lawyer licensed in the recipient’s state, country, or other appropriate licensing jurisdiction.
[1] 984 F. 3d 1199 2021 Fed. App. 0010P (6th Cir.)
[2] The ADEA protects workers over the age of forty from being discriminated against due to their age.
[3] All facts and law cited in this section may be found in Pelcha v. MW Bancorp, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 3d 481, 2020 WL 1904714.
[4] See footnote 2.
[5] Emphasis added. Blizzard, 698 F.3d at 283.
[6] Ultimately, Pelcha’s evidence did not show discrimination against her. Even assuming the CEO’s comments about the eighty-year-old employee were age-related, they were not directed at Pelcha. The CEO’s preference for younger employees was not discriminatory against older ones, and no action was taken against the eighty-year-old employee because of her age. Furthermore, her supervisor’s different treatment of younger employees was not determinative because she was not the one who fired Pelcha. Finally, the bank fired Pelcha for a violation of an employee policy and offered no other reason besides insubordination. Pelcha could not show her firing for insubordination was a pretext.
[7] Hannon, 784 F. App'x at 448 (quoting Diebel v. L & H. Res., LLC, 492 F. App'x 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2012)); see also Griffin v. Finkbeiner, 689 F.3d 584, 595 (6th Cir. 2012) (analyzing comments in a racial discrimination case and noting to be direct evidence of racial animus, the comments must “have some connection to the decision to terminate” the employee and that they must “specifically mention” the employee).
[8] All facts and law cited in this section may be found in Pelcha v. MW Bancorp, Inc., 984 F.3d 1199 (6th Cir.), opinion amended and superseded, 988 F.3d 318 (6th Cir. 2021).
[9] Emphasis in original.